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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613 allows a person who is dissatisfied by a
decision of the Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") to "obtain judicial review
by complying with the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act."
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court or
Court of Appeals to review all final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative hearings. Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a) and Rule 14 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over the
final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Does PEHP maintain standing to bring a declaratory action on a claim for
subrogation under the PEHP Master Policy?
2. Was the Hearing Officer correct by complying with the statutes and
common law in producing the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order?
3. Was summary judgment proper when there are no disputed material facts?
4. Did the Hearing Officer correctly determine that the contractual
subrogation provision in the PEHP Master Policy was enforceable?
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16(4) specifically enumerates the relief which this Court may grant on an
appeal from a formal administrative hearing before the Board. Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b-16(4) states:
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by one of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the
agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as
applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by
any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring
resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or
decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed
procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to
disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact,
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by
statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for
the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
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Kelly Kramer and Rose Kramer ("the Kramers") failed to point to any
specific subsection for relief under Section 63-46b-16(4) where the Board erred.
The Utah Court of Appeals has duly noted that "Because the standard of review
under UAPA will vary based on the subsection the claim is brought under, we
strongly encourage counsel to clearly identify under what section review is being
sought and to make certain they identify the appropriate standard of review under
that section" King v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281,1287 n.7 (Utah
Ct App. 1993)(Emphasis added).
Nevertheless, PEHP agrees with the Kramers that when challenging the
Board's conclusions of law, the standard of review is "correctness." Higgins v.
Salt Lake Co., 855 P.2d 2315 235 (Utah 1993).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
49-11-613. Appeals procedure — Right of appeal to hearing officer — Board
reconsideration — Judicial review.
(1) (a) All members, retirees, participants, alternative payees, or covered
individuals of a system, plan, or program under this title shall acquaint themselves
with their rights and obligations under this title.
(b) Any dispute regarding a benefit, right, obligation, or employment right
under this title is subject to the procedures provided under this section.
(c) A person who disputes a benefit, right, obligation, or employment right
under this title shall request a ruling by the executive director who may delegate
the decision to the deputy director.
(d) A person who is dissatisfied by a ruling of the executive director or deputy
director with respect to any benefit, right, obligation, or employment right under
this title shall request a review of that claim by a hearing officer.
(2) The hearing officer shall:
(a) be hired by the executive director after consultation with the board;
(b) follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, except as specifically modified under this title;
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(c) hear and determine all facts pertaining to applications for benefits under any
system, plan, or program under this title and all matters pertaining to the
administration of the office; and
(d) make conclusions of law in determining the person's rights under any
system, plan, or program under this title and matters pertaining to the
administration of the office.
(3) The board shall review and approve or deny all decisions of the hearing
officer in accordance with rules adopted by the board.
(4) The moving party in any proceeding brought under this section shall bear
the burden of proof.
(5) A party may file an application for reconsideration by the board upon any
of the following grounds:
(a) that the board acted in excess of its powers;
(b) that the order or award was procured by fraud;
(c) that the evidence does not justify the determination of the hearing officer; or
(d) that the party has discovered new material evidence that could not, with
reasonable diligence, have been discovered or procured prior to the hearing.
(6) The board shall affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of the hearing
officer, or remand the application to the hearing officer for further consideration.
(7) A party aggrieved by the board's decision may obtain judicial review by
complying with the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act.
(8) The board may make rules to implement this section.
49-20-105. Purpose.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a mechanism for covered employers to
provide covered individuals with group health, dental, medical, disability, life
insurance, medicare supplement, conversion coverage, cafeteria, flex plan, and
other programs requested by the state, its political subdivisions, or educational
institutions in the most efficient and economical manner.
31A-l-103(3)(f). Scope and applicability of title.
(3) Except as otherwise expressly provided, this title does not apply to: . . .
(f) self-insurance;...
SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Utah State Retirement Office ("Office*') as the governing body of the
Public Employees Health Program ("PEHP") [hereinafter the term "PEHP" will be
used to denote the Utah State Retirement Office on behalf of the Public
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Employees' Health Program], filed a Request for Declaratory Judgment on March
31, 2006, with the Utah State Retirement Board's ("Board") administrative
hearing officer. PEHP requested a judgment that Kelly Kramer and Rose Kramer
("the Kramers") refund $30,047.45 in overpaid health benefits to PEHP. See,
Hearing Record (hereinafter "HR") at 1-6.
On March 23, 2007, PEHP filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and
Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment. See, HR at 228236. On April 7, 2007, the Kramers filed a Memorandum in Opposition to
PEHP's Motion for Summary Judgment. See, HR at 272-284. On April 16, 2007,
PEHP filed a Response Memorandum supporting its Motion for Summary
Judgment. See, HR at 290-305.
On July 10, 2007, oral argument was heard by the Administrative Hearing
Officer (hereinafter "Hearing Officer"), Richard C. Howe, on PEHP's Motion for
Summary Judgment. See, HRat 336. The Kramers were represented by John F.
Fay of the law firm of Gregory and Swapp. PEHP was represented by David B.
Hansen of the law firm of Howard, Phillips & Andersen. See, HR at 336. On
July 30, 2007, the Hearing Officer issued his Ruling granting PEHP's Motion for
Summary Judgment and directed counsel for PEHP to draft Findings of Facts, and
Conclusions of Law and Order. See, HRat 322-23. The Kramer's counsel
objected to the proposed Order in a letter dated August 3, 2007. HR at 326-27.
Then on August 20, 2007, the Hearing Officer made revisions to the Conclusions
of Law on the record. HR at 334-35.
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The Hearing Officer signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order on August 22, 2007. See, Addendum A, HR at 339.

The Utah State

Retirement Board adopted the Final Order on September 7, 2007. See, Addendum
A, HR at 339.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE/ FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1.

Respondent, Kelly Kramer ("Mr. Kramer") enrolled with the PEHP
Preferred Care Plan on February 19, 1996. Addendum A; See also, HR
at 336-40.

2.

The Utah Public Employees Health/Dental Enrollment Form indicates
that Respondent Rose Kramer ("Ms. Kramer") was to be covered by
PEHP under her husbands plan. Id.

3.

Mr. Kramer signed his name on the signature line of the Utah Public
Employees Health/Dental Enrollment Form. Id.

4.

The Utah Public Employees Health/Dental Enrollment Form states, "I
represent all information is true and correct. By signing below I hereby:
. . . (6) agree to the terms and conditions in the Utah Retirement
Systems/PEHP Master Policy." Id

5.

The 2001 -2002 PEFIP Master Policy states in part:
In the event that Eligible Benefits are furnished to an
Insured for bodily injury or illness caused by a third
party, PEHP shall be and is hereby subrogated
(substituted) with respect to an Insured's right (to the
extent of the value of the benefits paid) to any claim
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against the third party causing bodily injury or illness,
regardless of whether the Insured has been made
whole or has been fully compensated for the injury or
illness. Acceptance of the benefits hereunder shall
constitute acceptance of PEHP's subrogation rights . ..
Id.
6.

On September 29, 2001, Ms. Kramer was in a motor vehicle accident.
Id

7.

Ms. Kramer received physical injuries as a result of the accident which
occurred on September 29, 2001. Id.

8.

PEHP paid for medical services received by Ms. Kramer for the injuries
she received as a result of the September 29, 2001, automobile accident
in the amount of thirty thousand, forty-seven dollars and forty-five cents
($30,047.45). Id

9.

Ms. Kramer obtained $100,000 from Allstate Insurance Company, the
third party driver's insurance company, as a result of the September 29,
2001 automobile collision. Id.

10.

To date PEHP has not been reimbursed by Mr. Kramer and/or Ms.
Kramer for amounts received from Allstate which, according to its
contractual subrogation rights under the PEHP Master Policy, should
have been returned to PEHP. Id.

1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1. PEHP maintained standing to bring this claim because it had a personal
stake in the outcome of the case.
PEHP maintained standing to bring a declaratory judgment against the
Kramers for reimbursement of $30,047.42 which the Kjramers refuse to reimburse
to PEHP. PEHP's request for declaratory judgment alleges PEHP suffered a
distinct injury giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome.
Instead of standing, it appears that the Kramer's actual argument is whether
the Board's administrative hearing process maintains subject matter jurisdiction
over PEHP's request for a declaratory judgment. However, even if this was their
argument, the board's administrative hearing process has subject matter
jurisdiction over all disputes benefits and legal rights arising under Title 49, such
as this one, pursuant to U.C.A. §49-11-613, the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act ("UAPA") and common law. See, Gunn v. Utah State Ret Bd, 2007 UT App
4.
2. The Board's Hearing Officer complied with all the process requirements
in adjudicating the claim and adopting the Order.
Both the Hearing Officer and the Board complied with the applicable
statutory requirements and the adjudicative hearing procedures in adopting their
order in this matter. Direction to PEHP's counsel to draft a proposed Order, does
not constitute error when the board's rules specifically allow for such, and the
Hearing Officer reviewed and made revisions to the Order.
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Here, the Hearing Officer ruled that PEHP's motion for summary judgment
was granted and directed PEHP's counsel to draft an appropriate Order. See, H.R.
at 322-24. On August 2, 2007, counsel for PEHP sent to the Kramer's counsel a
copy of a proposed order. See, H.R. at 325. On August 3, 2007, counsel for the
Kramers drafted a letter objecting to the proposed order. See, H.R. at 326-327.
On August 6, 2007, counsel for PEHP sent a letter to the Hearing Officer in
response to Appellant's counsel's objections to the proposed Order. See, H.R. at
328-329. On August 7, 2007, the Kramer's counsel wrote another letter to the
Hearing Officer regarding the proposed Order. See, H.R. at 330-331. On August
21, 2007, the Hearing Officer responded on the record to the Kramers' objections
by directing counsel for PEHP to "amend the Conclusions of Law to state that (1)
the Petitioner has standing to bring this proceeding citing statute relied on, and (2)
the subrogation clause is legally enforceable." See, Id. Thus, the Hearing Officer
specifically reviewed and considered the Appellant's objections to the proposed
Order and asked counsel for the Board to amend the Order. On August 22, 2007
the Hearing Officer signed the amended Order. See, H.R. at 336-339.
Given these facts, it cannot reasonably be said that the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order are not the Hearing Officers since the Hearing
Officer reviewed the document upon objections from counsel and made revisions.
The Order contains all of the items necessary to meet the requirements in the
Adjudicative Hearing Procedures under Utah law and should be affirmed.

9

3. The Hearing Officer correctly determined that summary judgment was
proper in this case because there are no disputed material facts.
The Hearing Officer correctly determined that under Rule 56 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, PEHP is entitled to summary judgment because there is
"no genuine issue as to any material fact," and PEHP is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Although the Kramers claim there were "implications" or
"consequences" of facts in dispute, they failed to actually dispute any facts before
the Hearing Officer in their Memorandum in Opposition to PEHP's Motion for
Summary Judgment, and do not raise additional factual arguments here. Although
there remain disputes between the parties regarding questions of law, nothing
would preclude summary judgment because there are no disputed facts. As such,
the Hearing Officer correctly determined that there were no material disputed facts
and that summary judgment was appropriate.
4. The Hearing Officer Correctly Determined that the Plain Language of
the PEHP Master Policy was Clear and Enforceable and that PEHP was
Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law.
The plain language of the PEHP Master Policy requires that PEHP be
reimbursed $30,047.45, which is the amount they paid in medical expenses for
Ms. Kramer for which she also received a $100,000 settlement from a third party.
Thus, the Hearing Officer correctly determined that based on this policy, PEHP
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Kramers agreed to the terms of the PEHP Master Policy when they
signed the enrollment form enrolling with PEHP. Yet, they incorrectly argue that
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they cannot be held to the terms of the PEHP Master Policy under regulations
found in the Utah Insurance Code Title 31 A. This is because the legislature
specifically exempted "self-insurance" plans, such as PEHP, from the provisions
of the Utah Insurance Code, Title 31A under U.C.A. § 31A-l-103(3)(f). It states,
"(3) Except as otherwise expressly provided, this title does not apply t o : . . .(f)
self insurance . . ." (Emphasis added.) Nowhere in the applicable section of Title
31A does it "expressly provide" that PEHP's self-insured plans are subject to this
section. Because PEHP is not subject to the Utah Insurance Code in providing
"self-insurance", the Kramer's argument fails and the PEHP Master Policy is the
valid contract between PEHP and the Kramers.
Despite the Hearing Officer's Conclusion of Law that the subrogation
provision of the PEHP Master Policy was enforceable, the Kramers also
incorrectly argue that the subrogation provision of the Master Policy was invalid
because it is ambiguous and violates equitable and public policy reasons.
The plain language of the PEHP Master Policy states:
In the event that Eligible Benefits are furnished to an Insured for bodily
injury or illness caused by a third party, PEHP shall be and is hereby
subrogated (substituted) with respect to an Insured's right (to the extent of
the value of the benefits paid) to any claim against the third party causing
bodily injury or illness, regardless of whether the Insured has been made
whole or has been fully compensated for the injury or illness. Acceptance
of the benefits hereunder shall constitute acceptance of PEHP's subrogation
rights . . .
HR at 21-22.
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This language is clear and unambiguous in requiring Ms. Kramer to
reimburse PEHP for the amount PEHP paid in medical claims due to her car
accident for which she received a $100,000 settlement from a third party. The
Kramers failed to point to any way in which this language could be reasonably
understood in two different ways. Because this language is clear and
unambiguous, the Hearing Officer correctly determined it to be enforceable
against the Kramers.
Similarly, the subrogation provision is not against public policy and valid
under equitable principles. Recently, this Court held that the applicability of the
subrogation provision in the PEHP Master Policy would be a "matter of contract
interpretation." Gunn v. Utah State Retirement Board, 2007 UT App 4, n. 1. Thus,
this court has already impliedly claimed that the subrogation provision is valid
under public policy and equity.
In fact, the Kramer's resort to arguing under the "reasonable expectations"
doctrine that the subrogation provision is unenforceable. This equitable doctrine
was expressly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court over 15 years ago. Allen v.
Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992) The
fact that the Kramers have repeated this argument in their appellate brief calls after
PEHP's counsel informed them that this was not good law before the Hearing
Officer, calls into question the credibility of all of the Kramers' arguments
attempting to invalidate the subrogation provision of the PEHP Master Policy.
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In short, the Kramers failed to provide any valid legal or equitable reason
why the subrogation provision of the PEHP Master Policy should not be enforced.
As such, the Hearing Officer correctly found in his Conclusions of Law that "The
contractual subrogation clause in the PEHP Master Policy is legally enforceable."
HR at 338. The Kramers should reimburse PEHP $30,047.42, the amount PEHP
paid in medical expenses for Ms. Kramer's car accident for which the Kramers
also received a $100,000 settlement from a third party.

ARGUMENT
I.

PEHP MAINTAINED STANDING TO BRING A DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT ACTION AGAINST THE KRAMERS BECAUSE PEHP HAD A
FINANCIAL STAKE IN THE CONTROVERSY.

PEHP maintained standing to bring a declaratory judgment against the
Kramers for reimbursement of $30,047.42 which the Kramers refuse to reimburse
to PEHP. Utah Courts have held that:
A plaintiff who has not been granted standing to sue by statute must either
show that he has or would suffer a "distinct and palpable injury that gives
rise to a personal stake in the outcome'* of the case or meet one of the two
exceptions to standing recognized in cases involving "important public
issues."
In re RK, 2006 UT 36,1J49, 137 P.2d 809, 819, quoting, Wash. County Water
Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, Tf 17, 82 P.3d 1125. PEHP^s request
for declaratory judgment alleges PEHP suffered a distinct injury giving rise to a
personal stake in the outcome. In fact, the Kramers never have made a claim,
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either before the Hearing Officer or in their Appellate Brief, that PEHP had no
stake in the outcome of the administrative action.
Instead of standing, it appears that the Kramer's actual argument is
whether the Board's administrative hearing process maintains subject matter
jurisdiction over PEHP's request for a declaratory judgment. Although the
Kramers' never made the express claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in
either their Appellate Brief or before the Hearing Officer, and cannot do so in a
Reply Brief,1 the board has subject matter jurisdiction over all disputes benefits
and legal rights arising under Title 49, such as this one. See, U.C.A. §49-11-613;
Gunn v. Utah State Ret. Bd, 2007 UT App 4.
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613 plainly states that jurisdiction over any
person's dispute concerning a benefit or legal right under Title 49 must be brought
through the Board's administrative hearing process. In compliance with the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") found in Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l
et. seq., U.C.A. §49-11-613 sets forth the appeals procedure for bringing a claim
1

The Kramers cannot raise new issues in a reply brief. The Court in Brown v.
Glover, 2000 UT 89, |23, 16 P.3d 540, 545, stated:
Generally, issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were not
presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be
considered by the appellate court. See Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah
Div. of State Lands & Forestry. 921 P.2d 1365, 1371 n. 11 (Utah 1996);
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 85 L 854 n. 1 (Utah 1992); 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate
Review § 560 (1995); 4 C J.$. Appeal and Error § 619 (1993). This is to
prevent the resulting unfairness to the respondent if an argument or issue
was first raised in the reply brief and the respondent had no opportunity to
respond. See Brown, 853 P.2d at 854 n. 1; 5 AmJur.2d Appellate Review §
560.
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for any "legal right" arising under Title 49. This procedure includes a formal
administrative hearing process and judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §49-11-613
states in part:
(l)(b) A person who claims a benefit, legal right, or employment
right under this title shall request a ruling by the executive director,
(c) A person who is dissatisfied by a ruling of the executive director
with respect to any benefit claim or legal rights under any
system, plan, or program under this title shall request a review of
that claim by a hearing officer.

(8) The board may make rules to implement this section.
Pursuant to the Board's authority in U.C.A. § 49-11-613(8), the Board
adopted administrative hearing rules which explain the administrative hearing
procedures. Those rules specifically allow for the Board to bring its own
declaratory action or a request for a decision by a Hearing Officer. These rules
state, "(l)( a ) The Executive Director . . . may file a petition for a declaratory order
determining the applicability of a statute, rule or order of the Board within the
primary jurisdiction of the Board to the specified circumstances of the person."
See, Addendum "B", Administrative Hearing Procedures. While it is true that
PEHP's claim for a declaratory judgment was never "denied" by the Executive

2

The Kramers make no claim that the Board failed to follow its hearing rules. In
fact, the Board followed its written procedure precisely in bringing this action.
See Addendum C, Affidavit of Robert V. Newman.
The Legislature has recently clarified the statute to more clearly allow PEHP to
initiate actions before the board's administrative hearing process under S.B. 116
(2008). See,U.C.A. §49-1 l-613(l)(e)(2008) which reads:
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Director of the Office, the Executive Director specifically authorized PEHP to
bring this declaratory action4 in compliance with the Administrative Hearing Rules
adopted by the board. Addendum "C", Affidavit of Robert V. Newman.
In harmony with U.C.A. §49-11-613, UAPA allows agencies to initiate
their own actions. U.C.A. §63-46b-21(l) states: "Any person may file a request
for agency action, requesting that the agency issue a declaratory order determining
the applicability of a statute, rule, or order within the primary jurisdiction of the
agency to specified circumstances. This language is nearly identical to U.C.A.
§49-1 l-613(l)(c) which states, "A person who is dissatisfied by a ruling of the
executive director with respect to any benefit claim or legal rights under any
system, plan, or program under this title shall request a review of that claim by a
hearing officer." UAPA then defines a "person" who can initiate an
administrative action in U.C.A. § 63-46b-2(l)(g) as: "an individual, group of
individuals, partnership, corporation, association, political subdivision or its units,
governmental subdivision or its units, public or private organization or entity of
any character, or another agency." (Emphasis added.) Indeed, the Board is a
"governmental subdivision" and an independent agency of the state or "another
agency" as set forth in U.C.A. § 63-46b-2(l)(g) and is, therefore, a "person"

(e) The executive director, on behalf of the board, may request that the
hearing officer review a dispute regarding any benefit, right, obligation, or
employment right under this title by filing a notice of board action and
providing notice to all affected parties in accordance with rules adopted by
the board.
4
Addendum "C" Affidavit of Robert V. Newman.
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allowed to bring a declaratory action against the Kramers in an administrative
proceeding.
In fact, the Utah Court of Appeals recently held in a case almost identical to
this one, that the Board maintained jurisdiction over an injured member's claim
that he was not subject to the subrogation provision in PEHP's Master Policy.
See, Gunn v. Utah State Retirement Board, 2007 UT App 4. The Court in Gunn
stated, "[Utah Code Ann. §49-11-613] is clear that any right asserted against
PEHP must be submitted first to the agency's review process." Id. at | 1 1 . Both
Mr. Gunn and Ms. Kramer were required to reimburse PEHP under the
subrogation clause of PEHP's Master Policy following their injuries caused by
third parties, and both refused to reimburse PEHP under its subrogation rights.
Mr. Gunn originally brought his declaratory action in Second District Court before
Judge Hansen. Judge Hansen dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction requiring Mr. Gunn first to seek remedies through the Board's
administrative hearing process. Mr. Gunn appealed and this Court affirmed.
Because the district courts have no jurisdiction over PEHP's subrogation issues,
PEHP had no choice but to bring its action before an Adjudicating Hearing Officer
for adjudication.
Therefore, the Board's administrative hearing procedures maintains subject
matter jurisdiction over declaratory actions brought by PEHP under U.C.A. § 4911-613, UAPA and the common law.
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In sum, PEHP maintained standing to bring its declaratory action because it
had a financial stake in the outcome. In addition, even if the issues was subject
matter jurisdiction, the board's administrative hearing process maintained subject
matter jurisdiction over this dispute under both the plain language of the
applicable statutes and the common law.

II.

THE HEARING OFFICER'S ORDER COMPLIED WITH ELEMENTS
REQUIRED UNDER UCA TITLE 49, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES ACT AND THE BOARD'S ADJUDICTIVE HEARING
PROCEDURES.

The Hearing Officer and the Board complied with UAPA and the
adjudicative hearing procedures in adopting their order in this matter. The
Adjudicative Hearing Procedures adopted by the Board in accordance with U.C.A.
§§49-11-203, 49-11-613, and 63-46b-l et.seq. provide that an order contain the
following:

7.
a)

b)

ORDERS
Within (30) days after the hearing, or after the filing of any post hearing
papers permitted or required by the hearing officer, the hearing officer
shall sign and issue an order that includes:
i) a statement of findings of fact based exclusively on the evidence of
record in the proceeding or on facts officially noted;
ii) a statement of conclusions of law;
iii) a statement of reasons for the decision;
iv) a statement of any relief ordered;
v) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration;
vi) a notice of any right to administrative or judicial review of the
order available to aggrieved parties; and
vii) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review.
The hearing officer may use his experience, technical competence, and
specialized knowledge to evaluate the evidence.
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c)
d)

e)

No finding of fact that was contested may be based solely on hearsay
evidence.
The hearing officer may issue interim orders to:
i) notify parties of further hearings;
ii) notify parties of provisional rulings on a portion of the issues
presented; or
iii) otherwise provide for the fair and efficient conduct of the
proceeding.
(i) The hearing officer may either draft the order or direct the
prevailing party to draft the order in accordance with these rules.
(ii) Parties shall have (5) days from the date the order is sent to file
written objections to the order,
(iii) The hearing officer shall consider any written objections and then
prepare a final order.

Addendum "B" at 8-9. (Emphasis added.)
The Hearing Officer followed all of the necessary elements as outlined in
these rules. On July 30, 2007, the Hearing Officer entered a ruling granting the
PEHP's Motion for Summary Judgment. See, H.R. at 322-324. The ruling
requested that counsel for PEHP "prepare an appropriate Order in conformity with
this Ruling." See, Id. This direction to counsel is consistent with the Adjudicative
Hearing Procedures which clearly state that the "hearing officer may either draft
the order or direct the prevailing party to draft the order in accordance with these
rules." Addendum B at 8. It is common practice in Utah for the court, "to ask
counsel for the prevailing party to draw proposed findings of fact. That practice is
so general as to be said to be the universal practice in this jurisdiction." Erkman v.
Civil Service Comm n ofProvo, 114 Utah 228, 236; 198 P.2d 238, 244 (Utah
1948). The Court continued, "it would not be seriously contended that such
proposed findings, when approved and adopted by the court, are not proper
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findings of fact sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement [to make findings of
fact]..." Id
On August 2, 2007, counsel for PEHP sent a copy of the proposed Order to
the Kramer's counsel. See, H.R. at 325. On August 3, 2007, counsel for the
Kramers drafted a letter objecting to the proposed Order. See, H.R. at 326-327.
On August 6, 2007, counsel for PEHP sent a letter to the Hearing Officer in
response to Kramers' counsel's objections to the proposed Order. See, H.R. at
328-329. On August 7, 2007, Kramers' counsel wrote another letter to the
Hearing Officer regarding the proposed Order. See, H.R. at 330-331. On August
21, 2007, the Hearing Officer responded on the record to the Kramers' objections
by directing counsel for PEHP to "amend the Conclusions of Law to state that (1)
the Petitioner has standing to bring this proceeding citing statute relied on, and (2)
the subrogation clause is legally enforceable." See, Id. Thus, the Hearing Officer
specifically reviewed the proposed Order and considered the Appellant's
objections to that proposed Order and then asked counsel for PEHP to amend the
Order. On August 22, 2007, the Hearing Officer signed the amended Order. See,
H.R. at 336-339.
The Kramers failed to point to any instance in the record in which the
Hearing Officer did not follow all of the required steps as outlined by the
Adjudicative Hearing Procedures or UAPA, nor did the Kramers show that the
Hearing Officer failed in any way to consider their arguments or deny them any
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process. The Order contains all of the items necessary to meet the requirements in
the Adjudicative Hearing Procedures under Utah law.

III.

THE HEARING OFFICER CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT PEHP IS
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE ARE NO FACTS
IN DISPUTE AND THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE MASTER POLICY
ENTITLES PEHP TO RECOVERY UP TO THE AMOUNT IT PAH) ON
BEHALF OF THE KRAMERS.

The Hearing Officer correctly determined that under Rule 56 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, PEHP is entitled to summary judgment because there is
"no genuine issue as to any material fact," and PEHP is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the
motion for summary judgment is supported by evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and shows that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact. See, Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1,
354 P.2d 559, 561 (1960). The Kramers incorrectly alleged summary judgment is
improper because 1) the Kramers failed to correctly dispute and thus agreed to the
undisputed facts in the Motion for Summary Judgment, 2) the Kramers failed to
allege any disputed facts, and 3) the Kramers misapplied to case law regarding
summary judgment.
First the Kramers failed to dispute any of PEHP's undisputed material facts
in PEHP's Motion for Summary Judgment, (HR at 272-284) although they claim
to dispute the "implications'* of the facts. This is different than actually disputing
the facts under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(c) states in
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relevant part, "(c).. . The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ut. R. Civ. P.
56(c). Thus, in order to properly dispute facts, the Kramers were required to
provide affidavits or other evidence contrary to those facts. Ut. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
See, Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985)(finding that when
motion for summary judgment is made, defending party affidavits must contain
specific evidentiary facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial). The
Kramers provided no affidavits or actual contentions disputing any of PEHP's
statement of undisputed facts. HR at 272-279. Because the Kramers did not
dispute the facts in their response memorandum to PEHP's Motion for Summary
Judgment, they are deemed undisputed under Rule 56(e).
In a similar vein, the Kramers also incorrectly claim that the Hearing
Officer failed to view the facts in a light most favorable to them, but they failed to
provide any evidence of such. Appellants' Opening Brief at 26. The fact that the
Hearing Officer adopted PEHP's undisputed facts in his Order should not be
surprising to either the Kramers or this Court since the facts were material to the
dispute and were undisputed by the Kramers in their response memorandum.
Second, the Kramers' additional "facts" which they set forth in their
Memorandum in Opposition to PEHP's Motion for Summary Judgment were
either undisputed or incorrect statements of law. See, HR at 279. As such, no
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disputed facts existed between the two parties, and the case was ripe for summary
judgment. Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678 (Utah 1982).
Third, the Kramers misapplied the case law regarding when summary
judgment is proper. Despite such seeming agreement under the summary
judgment briefs, and indeed even the apparent agreement in the Appellate Briefs,
the Kramers still incorrectly argue that summary judgment is not appropriate
because of disputed facts. In their Appellate Brief, the Kramers confusingly
contend that they "did not dispute certain facts", (Appellants' Opening Brief at 17)
and they refer to the facts in general as "undisputed facts" Id. at 19. Yet, they state
that summary judgment is not appropriate when the parties disagree on the
"consequences" of the facts. Id. at 19. In other words, the Kramers wish to make
it impossible for any grant of summary judgment by any court or administrative
body in claiming that any disagreement on the law (or consequences of facts)
would create a factual dispute precluding summary judgment. After all, if all
parties agreed on the facts and the legal consequences of those facts, there would
be no dispute. The Kramers simply misapply the case law and Rule 56 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
It is black letter law that summary judgment is appropriate when there are
no material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See, Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678 (Utah 1982): Judkins v. Toone, 492
P.2d 980 (1972); Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 368 P.2d 266 (1962). Instead of
reliance on the black letter rule, the Kramers misapply the language in Sandberg v.
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Klein, 576 P.2d 1291, 1292 (Utah 1978), where the court stated, "When the parties
were not in complete conflict as to certain facts, but the understanding, intention,
and consequences of those facts were vigorously disputed, the matter was not
proper for summary judgment and could only be resolved by trial." In Sandberg,
the Court wrestled with whether a party had exercised his option to purchase
property. Although the parties in Sandberg factually agreed about the language of
the contract, they disagreed about the procedure in exercising the option and
whether the option was waived for failure to act. The Court found the plain
language of the contract of little guidance in this procedure and remanded to the
trial court for further factual testimony. Nowhere does the Sandberg Court state or
even imply that if the consequences of facts result in a dispute of law that it would
preclude summary judgment. Instead, the Court in Sandberg supports summary
judgment in this case because both PEHP and the Kramers agree that the PEHP
Master Policy was the contract between them, and the Kramers agreed to abide by
the terms of the Master Policy when they enrolled in the plan.
Although there remain clear disputes between the parties here regarding
questions of law, nothing precludes summary judgment because there are no
disputed facts. As such, the Hearing Officer correctly determined that there were
no material disputed facts and that summary judgment was appropriate.
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IV.

THE HEARING OFFICER CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE PAIN
LANGUAGE OF THE PEHP MASTER POLICY WAS CLEAR AND
ENFORCEABLE AND THAT PEHP WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW.

The plain language of the PEHP Master Policy requires that PEHP be
reimbursed $30,047.45, which is the amount they paid in medical expenses for
Ms. Kramer for which she also received a $100,000 settlement from a third party.
Thus, the Hearing Officer correctly determined that based on this policy PEHP
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The PEHP Master Policy unambiguously states, under the heading
"Subrogation":
In the event that Eligible Benefits are furnished to an Insured for bodily
injury or illness caused by a third party, PEHP shall be and is hereby
subrogated (substituted) with respect to an Insured's right (to the extent of
the value of the benefits paid) to any claim against the third party causing
bodily injury or illness, regardless of whether the Insured has been made
whole or has been fully compensated for the injury or illness. Acceptance
of the benefits hereunder shall constitute acceptance of PEHP *s subrogation
rights . . .
HR at 21-22.
Here, "Eligible Benefits" were furnished to Ms. Kramer for the injuries she
suffered due to the car accident on September 29, 2001. Under the plain terms of
the Master Policy, PEHP is subrogated to Ms. Kramer's right to the $100,000 she
received in a settlement from a third party insurance company due to the accident.
Despite their large settlement, the Kramers refuse to reimburse PEHP the amount
to which it is entitled.
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Although the Kramers failed to specifically claim any error in the Hearing
Officer's Conclusions of Law5, and cannot do so in a Reply Brief6, PEHP will
respond to what it perceives as the implied arguments regarding the disputed
issues of law surrounding the application of the PEHP Master Policy. None of
these issues show the hearing officer erred in concluding PEHP was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

A.

The Kramers contracted with PEHP and agreed to the terms
and conditions of the PEHP Master Policy.

The parties agree that the Kramers' enrolled with PEHP and agreed to the
terms of the PEHP Master Policy by signing the PEHP enrollment form. HR at
231-232 and 273-274. Thus, the Hearing Officer correctly determined that "the
contractual subrogation clause in the PEHP Master Policy is legally enforceable"

5

The Kramers restate their arguments made before the Hearing Officer in their
Appellate's Opening Brief at 20-26, but do not claim the Hearing Officer erred in
making his conclusions of law.
6
The Kramers cannot raise new issues in a reply brief. The Court in Brown v.
Glover, 2000 UT 89, ^{23, 16 P.3d 540, 545, stated:
Generally, issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were not
presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be
considered by the appellate court. See Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah
Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365, 1371 n. 11 (Utah 1996);
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 85 h 854 n. 1 (Utah 1992); 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate
Review^ 560 (1995); 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 619 (1993). This is to
prevent the resulting unfairness to the respondent if an argument or issue
was first raised in the reply brief and the respondent had no opportunity to
respond. See Brown, 853 P.2d at 854 n. 1; 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review §
560.
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and "the plain language of the PEHP Master Policy requires PEHP to be
reimbursed $30,047.45, which is the amount it paid in medical expenses on behalf
of Ms. Kramer for which she also received a $100,000 settlement". See, HR at
338.
Despite such apparent agreement, the Kramers incorrectly imply in their
appellate brief that they cannot be held to their agreement to the terms of the
PEHP Master Policy because 1) the Master Policy was incorporated by reference
on the enrollment form, and 2) they never received a hard copy of the Master
Policy. Neither of these arguments were persuasive to the Hearing Officer, nor
should be to this court.
First, the PEHP Master Policy does not incorporate the subrogation
provision, or any other provision, by reference. The PEHP Master Policy was
clear and unambiguous in the subrogation section which required the Kramers to
reimburse to PEHP any amounts received from a third party liable to them for
injuries they suffered for which PEHP paid. As the enrollment form contains no
material terms between the parties, the PEHP enrollment form was not the contract
between the Kramers and PEHP. The contract between the parties is the PEHP
Master Policy.
Second, in the alternative, even if the enrollment form is deemed to be the
contract and the PEHP Master Policy is incorporated by reference, PEHP is not
prohibited from incorporating contract terms by reference under Utah law. The
only legal prohibition against incorporation by reference in an insurance policy is
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found in the Utah Insurance Code, U.C.A. §31A-21-106(1). However, the
legislature specifically exempted "self-insurance" plans, such as PEHP , from the
provisions of the Utah Insurance Code under U.C.A. § 31A-l-103(3)(f). It states,
"(3) Except as otherwise expressly provided, this title does not apply t o : . . .(f)
self insurance .. ." (Emphasis added.) Nowhere in U.C.A. §31A-21-106(1) does
it "expressly provide" that self-insured plans are subject to this section. Since
PEHP is a self insurance plan, it is not subject to the Utah Insurance Code, it is not
prohibited from incorporating its policy by reference, and the PEHP Master Policy
is the valid contract between PEHP and the Kramers.
Third, the Kramers misapply the case law in their contention that PEHP
must prove the Kramers were presented with a hard copy of the PEHP Master
Policy in order for the policy to be enforceable. The Kramers first cite to Farmers
Ins. Exchange v. Call, 111 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985) where summary judgment was
7

PEHP is a statutorily created program under Title 49, Chapter 20. The stated
purpose of Title 49 Chapter 20 is to "provide a mechanism for covered employers
to provide covered individuals with group health, dental, medical, disability, and
life insurance . . ." Utah Code Ann. §49-20-105. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§49-20-401, "(1)[HEHP] shall: (a) act as a self-insurer of employee benefit plans
and administer those plans . . ." (emphasis added.) In fact, the Legislature
specifically recognized that Title 31A exempts PEHP from coverage by making
specific exceptions mandating that PEHP comply with certain individual
provisions in Title 31 A. For example, Utah Code Ann. §49-20-407 states,
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection 31 A-1-103(3 )(f), health coverage
offered to the state employee risk pool under Subsection 49-20-202(1 )(a) shall
comply with the provisions of Section 31A-8-501 and 31 A-22-605.5." Similarly,
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-723(l) states, "(1) Notwithstanding Subsection 31 A-1103(3)(f), and except as provided in Subsection (3), all policies of accident and
health insurance offered on a group basis under this title, or Title 49, Chapter 20,
Public Employees' Benefit and Insurance Program Act,. . . [shall comply with
this section.]"
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reversed when the car insurance company could not prove their insured received a
copy of the exclusions in the policy. This case does not apply here, however, for
three reasons. One, the subrogation provision of the PEHP Master Policy is not an
exclusion. Two, this requirement on car insurance has never been extended to
health insurance policies, particularly ones in which no one assumes "full
coverage." And third, this case has been expressly limited in its application under
the "reasonable expectations" doctrine. See Allen v. Prudential Property and Cas.
Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 804-05 (Utah 1992). In short, this case does not require
that PEHP must prove it provided a hard copy of the PEHP Master Policy to the
Kramers in order to enforce that policy.
Similarly, the Kramers also wrongly claim that PEHP was required to prove
they had the opportunity to review the contract. They cite to McCoy v. Blue
Cross, 980 P.2d 694 (UT Ct. App. 1999) as authority for their position. However,
McCoy does not support this position. In McCoy, the court struck down the
insurer's arbitration provision when the insurer added an arbitration clause to the
insured's policy after the policy was in effect and without written notice. In other
words, if an insurer changed the material terms of the contract without written
notice, it is unenforceable.
The uncontested facts in this case are far different from those in McCoy.
Here, there was no change to the subrogation provision of the PEHP Master Policy
after the policy was in effect. The subrogation clause was in the Master Policy
when the Kramers enrolled with PEHP on February 19, 1996, and the Kramers
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accepted these terms by enrolling with PEHP. Nowhere in McCoy, or any other
Utah law, does it imply or state that for a court to enforce an insurance policy, the
insurer is required to prove the insured had received a copy and reviewed the
policy. As such, the Kramers' misapplication of the case law should be rejected,
and the Hearing Officer's decision to uphold the policy should be affirmed.

B.

The Hearing Officer correctly found the contractual
subrogation section of the PEHP Master Policy to be "legally
enforceable."

In his Order, the Hearing Officer correctly made the Conclusion of Law
that, "The contractual subrogation clause in the PEHP Master Policy is legally
enforceable." HR at 338. In other words, no common law, equitable or public
policy reasons exist to prevent the subrogation provision in the PEHP Master
Policy from being enforced according to its plain language. The provision in the
PEHP Master Policy states:
In the event that Eligible Benefits are furnished to an Insured for bodily
injury or illness caused by a third party, PEHP shall be and is hereby
subrogated (substituted) with respect to an Insured's right (to the extent of
the value of the benefits paid) to any claim against the third party causing
bodily injury or illness, regardless of whether the Insured has been made
whole or has been fully compensated for the injury or illness. Acceptance
of the benefits hereunder shall constitute acceptance of PEHP" s subrogation
rights . ..
HR at 21-22.
Because this language is clear and unambiguous, the Hearing Officer
correctly determined it to be enforceable against the Kramers. The undisputed
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facts show that PEHP originally paid $30,047.45 in medical claims for Ms.
Kramer due to a car accident. HR at 336-38. Subsequent to these payments, Ms.
Kramer received $100,000 from a third party insurance company liable to her for
her injuries. Id. Pursuant to the PEHP Master Policy, the Kramers are required to
reimburse PEHP the amount PEHP paid in claims for which the Kramers also
received a settlement from a third party.
Despite the clear language in the policy, the Kramers incorrectly argue that
this provision of the policy cannot be enforced because the policy is ambiguous
and violates both equity and public policy. Each of these arguments are discussed
below.
1.

The subrogation provision in the PEHP Master Policy is clear
and unambiguous.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that an "insurance policy is a contract
between two parties." Quaidv. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 2007 WL 861155 *2 (Utah
2007). The Court stated that "[i]f the language within the four corners of the
policy is unambiguous, the parties' intent should be surmised from the 'plain
meaning of the contractual language/" Id. (quoting Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins.
Co., 2006 UT 37, 14, 140 P.3d 1210; Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20,
21, 133 P.3d 428). The unambiguous language within an insurance policy is given
its ordinary meaning whether it will either affirm or deny coverage. See, Alfv.
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993). A phrase is
unambiguous when its plain meaning is understood by "a person of ordinary
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intelligence and understanding viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in
accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words, and in the light of
existing circumstances." Draughon v. CUNA Mutual Ins. Society, 111 P.2d 1105,
n. 4 (UT Ct. App. 1989).
Utah courts have held that a contract is ambiguous if it is unclear or omits
terms. See, Id. However, Utah courts have stated, "policy terms are not
necessarily ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow them with a
different interpretation according to his or her own interests." Id.
The uncontested facts in this case clearly show that the PEHP Master
Policy is clear and unambiguous. The PEHP Master Policy states:
In the event that Eligible Benefits are furnished to an Insured for bodily
injury or illness caused by a third party, PEHP shall be and is hereby
subrogated (substituted) with respect to an Insured's right (to the extent of
the value of the benefits paid) to any claim against the third party causing
bodily injury or illness, regardless of whether the Insured has been made
whole or has been fully compensated for the injury or illness. Acceptance
of the benefits hereunder shall constitute acceptance of PEHP's subrogation
rights . . .
HR at 21-22. In addition, the PEHP Master Policy provides definitions of
the terms "Eligible Benefit" and "subrogation" which are used in the subrogation
section, and the plain language is clear and can be understood by a person of
ordinary intelligence. In fact, the Kramers' only argument for ambiguity in the
Master Policy is that the Master Policy did not expressly define what they
considered "operative terms." Appellant's Brief at 20. However, the Kramers
point to no actual operative terms or ideas which they claim were omitted from the
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subrogation section of the Master Policy. Instead, they merely lob allegations
without support in making their claim without any explanation as to why the
Master Policy provision is ambiguous, what terms are undefined, or what part of
the policy would not be understood by the reasonable purchaser of insurance. The
Kramers simply failed to provide any legitimate fact or law to support their claim
that the subrogation provision of the PEHP Master Policy was ambiguous in any
way. As such, this Court should find the PEHP Master Policy clear and
unambiguous.
2.

The Subrogation provision of the PEHP Master Policy is
enforceable under Utah's common law, equitable principles
and public policy.

Common law, equitable principles and public policy do not prohibit the
subrogation provision of the PEHP Master Policy. Contractual subrogation
provisions in health policies have been upheld as enforceable by both Utah courts
and in other jurisdictions. See, e.g. Borg v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 2004 Ut.
App. 74 TJ 3; Educators' Mutual Ins. Ass 'n. v Allied Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 890
P.2d 1029, 1032; Macejko v. Ortiz., 2008 WL 697688 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). In
fact, as Judge Bench stated in Gunn v. Utah State Retirement Board, 2007 UT App
4, n. 1, and the Hearing Officer ultimately found in this case, whether PEHP has a
right to subrogation under the PEHP Master Policy is a "matter of contract
interpretation." Id.
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Although the common law doctrine of subrogation requires a party to be
"made whole" prior to an insurer enforcing subrogation rights, the PEHP Master
Policy expressly modifies the subrogation doctrine by contract. It states:
In the event that Eligible Benefits are furnished to an Insured for bodily
injury or illness caused by a third party, PEHP shall be and is hereby
subrogated (substituted) with respect to an Insured's right (to the extent of
the value of the benefits paid) to any claim against the third party causing
bodily injury or illness, regardless of whether the Insured has been made
whole or has been fully compensated for the injury or illness. Acceptance
of the benefits hereunder shall constitute acceptance of PEHP's subrogation
rights .. .
HR at 21-22.
The Utah Court of Appeals recently stated, "The subrogation doctrine can
be modified by contract. . ." Birch v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 2005 UT App 395, ^f 7,
122 P.3d 696, 698; citing, Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864,
866 (Utah 1988). Furthermore, the Utah Court of Appeals recently upheld its
position in Birch, a case involving PEHP, and found that "'[t]he subrogation
doctrine can be modified by contract.' Because the parties agreed to the
subrogation provision which is contained in the PEHP Master Policy and agreed to
by enrolling in PEHP8, the issue of whether PEHP waived its claim is a matter of

8

The Kramers also make the incorrect claim that in order to be enforced, a party
must "knowingly waive" their "made whole" common law rights. Presumably this
means some affirmation in addition to agreement to abide by the terms of the
PEHP Master Policy. Aside from the fact that the Kramers actually agreed to a
modification of the common law subrogation doctrine by agreeing to the
subrogation terms in the PEHP Master Policy, the Kramers failed to provide any
statute or common law to support their claimed requirement for an affirmative
waiver. Utah simply has no requirement to "knowingly waive" common law
rights in some specific manner other than through contract.
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contract interpretation." Gunn v. Utah State Retirement Board, 2007 UT App 4,
n. 1. Thus, because the contract between the Kramers and PEHP was expressly
modified to require that PEHP be reimbursed for third party liability, regardless of
whether Ms. Kramer was made whole, Ms. Kramer must reimburse PEHP the
amount PEHP paid in medical expenses.
Nevertheless, the Kramers incorrectly contend that the subrogation
provision cannot be enforced under equitable principles of subrogation because it
would result in a double recovery for PEHP and result in "grave financial
injustice" to the Kramers. This argument is incorrect because 1) the common law
subrogation doctrine can be modified by contract as discussed supra, and 2) the
Kramers provided no factual or legal support for their position. Simply put, any
amounts received by PEHP are used to benefit all of PEHP's insureds. PEHP has
no profit motive being an independent state agency. Meanwhile, the Kramers
received a $100,000 settlement of which PEHP wishes to be reimbursed
approximately only $30,000. The fact that even after the Kramers reimburse
PEHP, the Kramers will obtain $70,000 for their settlement does not constitute any
kind of "grave financial injustice" to invalidate a contractual term under public
policy concerns.
Third, and perhaps most disturbing, the Kramers continue to argue that the
common law "reasonable expectations" doctrine is valid in Utah, even after
knowing the Utah Courts have expressly rejected this doctrine. The Kramers state,
"Provisions that are against public policy or against the reasonable expectations of
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the parties may be found void in appropriate circumstances. Wagner v. Farmers
Ins., 786 P.2d 763, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)." Appellants' Opening Brief at 25.
This is known as the "reasonable expectations" doctrine. However, Wagner and
its progeny were expressly overruled by the Utah Supreme Court in 1993. See, Alf
v. State Farm, 850 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1993). Allen at 806. ("We decline to adopt
the Wagner reasonable expections approach." Allen at 806.) The Supreme Court
of Utah declined to adopt the reasonable expectations doctrine holding, "this court
recently addressed the validity of the reasonable expectations doctrine m Allen v.
Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. and declined to adopt it as the law
in Utah. . . . our decision in Allen is dispositive . .." Id. Therefore, the Kramers'
contention that the Master Policy violates their reasonable expectations is
irrelevant because this is not the law.
The Kramers knew or should have known that this is not the law in Utah,
especially after the Board's counsel informed them on the record in its reply brief
on the Motion for Summary Judgment. The fact that the Kramers have repeated
this argument in their appellate brief calls into question the credibility of all of the
Kramers' arguments attempting to invalidate the subrogation provision of the
PEHP Master Policy.
Fourth, the common fund doctrine does not invalidate the subrogation
provision in the PEHP Master Policy. Nowhere in Utah common law or in statute
does the common fund doctrine invalidate contractual provisions. See, e.g. Barker
v. Utah Public Serv. Comm., 970 P.2d 702, 711 (Utah 1998). Instead, it allows
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attorneys in certain limited instances to recover a fair share of attorney fees if a
common fund is created from a judgment or settlement due to an attorney's
efforts. Because the Kramers are not the attorney who obtained the settlement,
they have no standing to bring such a claim and are not entitled to any recovery
under this doctrine.
In sum, the Kramers failed to provide any valid legal or equitable reason
why the subrogation provision of the PEHP Master Policy should not be enforced.
As such, the Hearing Officer correctly found in his Conclusions of Law that "The
contractual subrogation clause in the PEHP Master Policy is legally enforceable."
HR at 338. The Kramers should reimburse PEHP $30,047.45, which is the
amount PEHP paid in medical expenses for Ms. Kramer's car accident for which
the Kramers also received a $100,000 settlement from a third party.
CONCLUSION
PEHP hereby requests this Court to reject the Kramer's appeal in its
entirety. The board's administrative hearing process had subject matter
jurisdiction, and PEHP maintained standing to bring their claim for a declaratory
judgment against the Kramers.
Furthermore, the Hearing Officer correctly followed the administrative
hearing procedures in conducting the hearing and in producing the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order ruling that PEHP was entitled to summary
judgment on their claim for contractual subrogation. The Hearing Officer
correctly found that no disputed, material facts exist which would preclude
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summary judgment, and that PEHP was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
under the plain language of the PEHP Master Policy.
Because the PEHP Master Policy, the contract between the Kramers and
PEHP, requires reimbursement of any amounts received due to third party
liability, and because Ms. Kramer received a $100,000 settlement from a third
party liable to her for injuries, the Hearing Officer correctly concluded that the
Kramers must reimburse PEHP for the $30,047.45 in medical expenses it paid on
Ms. Kramer's behalf. The Hearing Officer also correctly found the subrogation
clause of the PEHP Master Policy enforceable. The Kramer's provided no valid
excuses, either legal or equitable, why the PEHP Master Policy should not be
enforced.
Thus, the board's Order granting summary judgment to PEHP should be
affirmed.

DATED this d^

day of March, 2008.

Hansen
Howard, Phillips & Andersen
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee/Petitioner were mailed, postage prepaid, to John F. Fay of Gregory &
Swapp,, Suite 300, 2975 West Executive Parkway, Lehi, Utah 84043, on this the
ZfF*
day of March, 2008.
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ADDENDUM A

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' HEALTH
PROGRAM,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
,

v.
KELLY KRAMER and ROSE KRAMER,

File #: 06-07H

Respondents.

A hearing was held on July 10, 2007, before the Adjudicative Hearing Officer, Richard
C. Howe on Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Petitioner was represented by its
attorney David B. Hansen. Respondent appeared in person and was represented by her attorney
John F. Fay. Based upon the evidence in this matter and the legal memoranda submitted, the
Adjudicative Hearing Officer rendered a ruling dated July 30, 2007. The Adjudicative Hearing
Officer now makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Respondent, Kelly Kramer ("Mr. Kramer") enrolled with the PEHP Preferred Care
Plan on February 19, 1996.

1
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The Utah Public Employees Health/Dental Enrollment Form indicates that
Respondent Rose Kramer ("Ms. Kramer") was to be covered by PEHP under her
husbands plan.
Mr. Kramer signed his name on the signature line of the Utah Public Employees
Health/Dental Enrollment Form.
The Utah Public Employees Health/Dental Enrollment Form states, "I represent all
information is true and correct. By signing below I hereby: . . . (6) agree to the terms
and conditions in the Utah Retirement Systems/PEHP Master Policy."
The 2001-2002 PEHP Master Policy states in part:
In the event that Eligible Benefits are furnished to an Insured for
bodily injury or illness caused by a third party, PEHP shall be and
is hereby subrogated (substituted) with respect to an Insured' right
(to the extent of the value of the benefits paid) to any claim against
the third party causing bodily injury or illness, regardless of
whether the Insured has been made whole or has been folly
compensated for the injury or illness. Acceptance of the benefits
hereunder shall constitute acceptance of PEHP's subrogation rights

On September 29, 2001, Ms. Kramer was in a motor vehicle accident.
Ms. Kramer received physical injuries as a result of the accident which occurred on
September 29,2001.
PEHP paid for medical services received by Ms. Kramer for the injuries she received
as a result of the September 29, 2001, automobile accident in the amount of thirty
thousand, forty-seven dollars and forty-five cents ($30,047.45).
Ms. Kramer obtained $100,000 from Allstate Insurance Company, the third party
driver's insurance company, as a result of the September 29, 2001 automobile
collision.
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10.

To date PEHP has not been reimbursed by Mr. Kramer and/or Ms. Kramer for
amounts received from Allstate which, according to its contractual subrogation rights
under the PEHP Master Policy, should have been returned to PEHP.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Petitioner has standing to bring this action against Respondents pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §49-11-613.

2.

The contractual subrogation clause in the PEHP Master Policy is legally enforceable.

3.

Petitioner is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact.

4.

The plain language of the PEHP Master Policy requires PEHP to be reimbursed
$30,047.45 the amount it paid in medical expenses on behalf of Respondent Ms.
Kramer for which she also received a $100,000 settlement.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted
and Respondents reimburse $30,047.45 to Petitioner.

BOARD RECONSIDERATION
Within ten (10) days of a Board order, any party may file a written request for
reconsideration stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested as set forth in Utah
Code Ann. §49-11-613. This filing for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial
review of the order on review. The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the Board and
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one copy sent by mail to each person making the request. The Board chairman or executive
director shall issue a written order granting or denying the request within twenty (20) days of
receipt. If no order is issued within twenty (20) days, the request is denied.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
If Respondents are aggrieved with the final Board order, they may seek a judicial review
within thirty (30) days after the date that the order constituting final Board action is issued.
Respondents shall name the Board and all other appropriate parties. The Utah Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction to review all final Board actions resulting from formal proceedings. All
respondents shall follow the procedures established in Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-17.

DATED this J l # day of _ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 2 0 0 7 .

Richard C. Howe
Adjudicative Hearing Officer

The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Denial of the
Adjudicative Hearing Officer is hereby adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement Board.
Dated this ~7fk

day of

S&ft

2007.

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

BY 2 ^ ^
David B. Winder, Board President

§00339

APPROVED AS TO FORM

John F. Fay

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this the 1 l^^liay of e^C^>^ry>V>cr> , 2007,1 mailed a true
and correct copy of the above Order, postage pre-paid, to the following:

John F. Fay
Gregory & Swapp
Suite 300
2975 West Executive Parkway
Lehi, UT 84043

David B. Hansen
Howard, Phillips & Andersen
560 East 200 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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ADDENDUM B

ADJUDICATIVE HEARING PROCEDURES
In accordance with Sections 49-11-203, 49-11-613, and 63-46b-l et. seq., U.C.A. 1953, as
amended, the following rules are hereby adopted by the Utah State Retirement Board ("Board")
to govern all parties in any adjudicative proceeding held under the authority and direction of the
Board:
1.

DECLARATORY ORDERS
a)

The executive director, a participating employer, or any person eligible for benefits
under a system, plan, or program administered by the Board may file a petition for a
declaratory order determining the applicability of a statute, rule, or order of the Board
within the primary jurisdiction of the Board to the specified circumstances of the
person.

b)

The petition shall contain:
i)

a clear and concise statement of facts upon which the request for a declaratory
order is based;

c)

ii)

a citation to applicable statutes, rules or orders; and

iii)

the specific type of order or relief requested.

Within 60 days of the receipt of the petition for a declaratory order, the hearing officer
shall issue a written order which:
i)

declares the applicability of the statutes, rules, or orders to the specified
circumstances of the person;

ii)

sets the matter for adjudicative proceedings; or

iii)

declines to issue a declaratory order.

If the hearing officer has not issued a declaratory order within 60 days, the petition is
denied.
d)

e)

The declaratory order must contain:
i)

the names of all parties to the proceeding;

ii)

the particular facts on which the order is based; and

hi)

facts and law supporting the conclusion reached in the order.

No declaratory order will be issued in the following circumstances:
i)

where the Board lacks jurisdiction;

ii)

if the person requesting the order participated in an adjudicative proceeding
concerning the same issue.

f)

The hearing officer will not issue an order that substantially prejudices the rights of a
person who would be a necessary party unless that person consents in writing to the
determination of the matter by a declaratory proceeding.

g)

Any person who meets the requirements of intervention under Section 63-46b-9,
U.C.A. 1953, as amended, Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings Intervention, may intervene in a declaratory order. The petition for intervention shall
include a statement of facts demonstrating that the intervenor's legal rights or interest
will be substantially affected by the declaratory order, and a statement of relief sought
by the intervenor.

h)

A declaratory order issued by the hearing officer has the same status and binding

effect as any other order issued in an adjudicative proceeding.

2.

ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS
a)

All adjudicative proceedings shall be conducted formally pursuant to the provisions of
Sections 63-46b-6 through 63-46b-ll, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, Utah Administrative
Procedures Act, as amended, before a hearing officer designated by the executive
director.

b)

The hearing officer may set any matter for adjudicative proceedings whether pursuant
to a declaratory order, a notice of Board action, or a Request for Board Action.

c)

If the proceedings are commenced by the executive director in the name of the Board,
the Notice of Board Action shall be in writing signed by the executive director or
legal counsel, shall be sent to each respondent, and shall include:
i)

the names and addresses of all respondents and other persons to whom notice
will be given and the name, title, and mailing address of any attorney or
employee who has been designated to represent the Board;

ii)

the Board's file or other reference number;

iii)

the name of the proceeding;

iv)

the date the Notice of Board Action was mailed;

v)

a notice that the proceeding will be conducted formally;

vi)

a statement that a written response must be filed within 30 days of the mailing
date of the Notice of Board Action;

vii) a statement of the time and place of any scheduled hearing, a statement of the
purpose for which the hearing is to be held; and a statement that a party who
fails to attend may be held in default;

viii) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the adjudicative
proceeding will be maintained;
ix)

the name, mailing address, and telephone number of the executive director; and

x)

a statement of the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding and the issues to be
decided,

d)

If the action is initiated by a person or entity other than the executive director in the
name of the Board, the Request for Board Action shall be in writing, signed by the
person or legal counsel initiating the Action, shall be sent to each respondent, and
include:
i)

the names and addresses of all persons to whom a copy of the Request for Board
Action is being sent;

ii)

the Board's file or other reference number, if known;

hi)

the name of the proceeding, if known;

iv)

the date the Request for Board Action was mailed;

v)

a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which Board action is
requested;

vi)

a statement of the relief sought from the Board; and

vii) a statement of the facts and reasons forming the basis for relief.
The Board may prescribe one or more printed forms eliciting the information required. The
person or entity filing the request shall send copies to the executive director and to each person
who is known to have a direct interest in the action.
e)

Any time before a final order is issued, the hearing officer may convert the formal
proceeding to an informal proceeding if:

i)

conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest;

ii)

conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly prejudice the rights of any party;
and

iii)
f)

all parties so stipulate,

If the proceeding is converted to informal proceedings, the provisions of Section 6346b-5, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, Procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings,
shall apply.

3.

FORMAL PROCEEDINGS AND RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS
a)

Each respondent shall file and serve a written response within 30 days of the mailing
date of the Notice of Board Action or Request for Board Action. The response shall
include:
i)

the Board's file or other reference number;

ii)

the name of the adjudicative proceeding;

iii)

a statement of relief requested by the respondent;

iv)

a statement of the facts; and

v)

a statement summarizing the reasons for which the relief requested should be
granted,

b)

The response shall be filed with the Retirement Office, and one copy sent by mail to
each party. Other pleadings may be submitted in accordance with the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure or in accordance with the directions of the hearing officer.

4.

DISCOVERY AND SUBPOENAS
a)

Discovery is permitted in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

b)

The executive director or hearing officer may, upon request or upon his own motion,
issue subpoenas and other orders to secure the attendance of witnesses or the
production of evidence and may seek judicial enforcement of such orders as provided
by law.

5.

HEARING PROCEDURE
a)

A hearing shall be held in all formal proceedings if requested by one or more of the
parties. The hearing officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full
disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all parties reasonable opportunity to present
their positions.

b)

The hearing officer, either on his own motion, or upon objection by a party:
i)

may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious;

ii)

shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah;

iii)

may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy
or the excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the original document; and

iv)

may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially noticed under the
Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of other proceedings before the Board,
and of technical or scientific facts within the hearing officer's specialized
knowledge.

c)

The hearing officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay.

d)

The hearing officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to present evidence,
argue, respond, conduct cross examination, and submit rebuttal evidence.

e)

The hearing officer may give persons who are not a party to the hearing an
opportunity to present oral or written statements at the hearing.

f)

All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be considered in
reaching a decision on the merits, shall be given under oath.

g)

The hearing shall be recorded at Board expense, The Board will determine the
method of recording and may specify recording tape.

h)

Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the hearing officer
prepare a transcript of the hearing, but the hearing officer may take steps necessary to
protect confidential information disclosed at the hearing,

i)

All hearings are open to all parties,

j)

The hearing officer may take appropriate measures to preserve the integrity of the
hearing,

k)

The petitioner in all proceedings'shall bear the burden of proving the Petitioner's case
by a preponderance of the evidence and shall also have the burden of going forward
with the case.

1)

The hearing officer may order additional briefing or evidence at the hearing officer's
discretion.

6.

INTERVENTION
a)

Any person not a party may file a signed, written petition to intervene in a proceeding
with the Board, pursuant to the requirements of Section 63-46b-9, U.C.A. 1953, as
amended, Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings - Intervention.

b)

04-04-03

The intervenor shall mail a copy of the petition to each party which includes:
i)

the Board's file or other reference number;

ii)

the name of the proceeding;
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iii)

a statement of facts demonstrating that the intervener's legal rights or interests
are substantially affected by the proceeding, or that the intervenor qualifies as an
intervenor under any provision of law; and

iv)
c)

a statement of relief that the intervenor seeks from the Board.

The hearing officer shall grant a petition for intervention if the hearing officer
determines that:
i)

the intervenor's legal interest may be substantially affected by the proceeding;
and

ii)

the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the proceedings
will not be materially impaired by allowing the intervention.

d)

Any order granting or denying a petition to intervene shall be in writing and sent by
mail to the intervenor and each party.

e)

Any order granting intervention may impose conditions on the intervenor's
participation in the proceedings that are necessary for a just, orderly and prompt
conduct of the proceeding, and these conditions may be imposed at any time after the
intervention.

7.

ORDERS
a)

Within (30) days after the hearing, or after the filing of any post hearing papers
permitted or required by the hearing officer, the hearing officer shall sign and issue an
order that includes:
i)

a statement of findings of fact based exclusively on the evidence of record in the
proceeding or on facts officially noted;

ii)

a statement of conclusions of law;
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iii)

a statement of reasons for the decision;

iv)

a statement of any relief ordered;

v)

a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration;

vi)

a notice of any right to administrative or judicial review of the order available to
aggrieved parties; and

vii) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review.
b)

The hearing officer may use his experience, technical competence, and specialized
knowledge to evaluate the evidence.

c)

No finding of fact that was contested maybe based solely on hearsay evidence.

d)

The hearing officer may issue interim orders to:

e)

i)

notify parties of further hearings;

ii)

notify parties of provisional rulings on a portion of the issues presented; or

iii)

otherwise provide for the fair and efficient conduct of the proceeding.

(i)

The hearing officer may either draft the order or direct the prevailing party to
draft the order in accordance with these rules,

(ii)

Parties shall have (5) days from the date the order is sent to file written
objections to the order,

(iii) The hearing officer shall consider any written objections and then prepare a final
order.
8,

DEFAULT
a)

04-04-03

The hearing officer may issue a default order if a party to the formal proceeding:
i)

fails to attend or participate in the proceedings after notice;

ii)

fails to file a response as a respondent; or
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iii)

fails, as the moving party, to take affirmative steps to pursue their claim within
six months.

b)

The order shall include the grounds for default and shall be mailed to all parties.

c)

A defaulted party may seek to have the hearing officer set aside the default order
according to procedures outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

d)

After issuing the default order, the hearing officer shall complete the proceeding
without the defaulted party and shall determine all issues in the proceeding, including
those affecting the defaulting party.

9.

BOARD REVIEW
a)

in accordance with Section 49-11-613, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, Appeals Procedure
- Right of Appeal to hearing officer - Board reconsideration - Judicial review, the
Board shall review the order of the hearing officer within (30) days or at the next
regularly scheduled meeting of the Board in excess of 30 days.

b)

The Board may allow parties to file briefs or other papers to supplement the record
made before the hearing officer. In no case will a de novo hearing be held by the
Board.

c)

The Board may, if it is not satisfied with the record before it, refer the matter back to
the hearing officer for the taking of additional evidence as directed.

d)

Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties.

e)

Within 30 days of the date on which the order is reviewed, or the last date on which
any supplemental findings are allowed, whichever is later, the Board shall issue a
written order on review or may adopt the written order of the hearing officer.
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f)

The Board order shall be signed by the Board President or the Board President's
designee and shall be mailed to each party.

g)

The Board order on review shall contain each of the items listed in Section 7(a) of
these Rules for Adjudicative Procedures.

BOARD RECONSIDERATION
a)

Within 10 days after the date that a Board order on review is issued, any party may
file a written request for reconsideration stating the specific grounds upon which
relief is requested as set forth in Section 49-11-613, U.C.A. 1953, as amended,
Appeals procedure - Right of Appeal to hearing officer - Board reconsideration Judicial review. This filing for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking
judicial review of the order on review.

b)

The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the Board and one copy sent by
mail to each person malcing the request.

c)

The Board President or executive director shall issue a written order granting or
denying the request within 20 days of receipt. If no order is issued within 20 days, the
request is denied.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
a)

Any party aggrieved by the final Board order may seek a judicial review within 30
days after the date that the order constituting final Board action is issued.

b)

The petition shall name the Board and all other appropriate parties as respondents.

c)

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final Board actions resulting
from formal adjudicative proceedings. All petitioners shall follow the procedure
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established in Section 63-46b-165 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, Judicial review - Formal
adjudicative proceedings, in the appeals process.
12. STAYS AND OTHER TEMPORARY REMEDIES
a)

The Board may grant a stay or other temporary remedy during the tendency of judicial
review if such order is deemed essential to effect substantial justice.

b)

Parties shall petition for a stay or other temporary remedy unless extraordinary
circumstances require immediate judicial intervention.

c)

If the Board denies a stay or other temporary remedy, the Board's order of denial shall
be mailed to all parties and shall specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary
relief was not granted.

13.

CIVIL ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS
a)

The Board may seek enforcement of an order by seeking civil enforcement in the
district courts by following the procedure established under Section 63-46b-19(l)
U.C.A. 1953, as amended, Civil enforcement.

b)

Any person whose interests are directly impaired or threatened by the failure of the
Board to enforce an order may timely file a complaint seeking civil enforcement of
that order in accordance with the procedures established under Section 63-46b-19(2)
U.C.A. 1953, as amended, Civil enforcement,

14.

THE ROLE OF THE MEMBERSHIP COUNCIL
The executive director or hearing officer shall report the final Board order in any

adjudicative proceeding to the membership council. The council may then review the order and
elect to seek legislation to correct any inequities which it finds has resulted from the proceedings.
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ADDENDUM C

DAVID B.HANSEN [8197]
LIZA J. EVES [9660]
HOWARD, PHILLIPS & ANDERSEN, Attorneys for Petitioner
560 East 200 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 366-7471
Fax:(801)366-7706
Email: DBH@HPALAW.COM

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT V. NEWMAN
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' HEALTH
File No. 06:07H
PROGRAM,
Petitioner,

Hearing Officer: HOWE

v.
KELLY KRAMER and ROSE
KRAMER,
Respondents.

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
County of Salt Lake )
Robert V. Newman being first duly sworn, on his oath deposes and says:
1.

I am the Executive Director of the Utah State Retirement Systems.

2.

I was the Executive Director on March 31, 2006, when counsel for the Utah
State Retirement Systems, David B. Hansen, filed a Request for Declaratory
Judgment in the Utah State Retirement Board, Public Employees' Health

Program v. Kelly Kramer and Rose Kramer case.
3.

I authorized Mr. Hansen to file the Request for Declaratory Judgment on
behalf of the Utah State Retirement Board, Public Employees' Health
Program.

DATED this ?#_ day of March, 2008.

Robert V. Newman

Subscribed and sworn to before me this Zfl^day of March, 2008.
Notary Public

•

JULIANNE PARTRIDGE [
560 East 200 South, Suite 300 g
Salt Lake City. Utah 84102
1
My Commission Expires
•
September 24,2011
|
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